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Abstract
This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influ-
ences the accountability of politicians. Assuming that politicians are controlled by
the voters through reelection rules, we analyze to what extent economic integra-
tion affects the form of those rules and the efforts made by politicians. We define
economic integration by the existence of policies and shocks interdependences be-
tween countries. Then, from a political point of view, this integration is shown to
be a two-sided phenomenon. Shock-interdependence allows yardstick comparison,
increases political accountability and therefore efforts while policy-interdependence
induces a lack of responsibility and harms the extent to which politicians can be
controlled.
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1 Introduction
For now more than a half of century, the world has witnessed a trend of trade globalization
(see Feenstra (1998)). In 1950, the volume of foreign trade1 of the USA accounted for
3% of their GDP whereas it now more than 12%. This movement has been even more
substantial in the European countries where the ratio of exports to GDP is now about
25% for countries like Germany or France. The analysis of the economic impact of this
sharp transformation has been studied in depth by economists 2. What we rather aim at
doing is to concentrate on the political impact of globalization. More precisely, we will see
to what extent the change in the economic conditions induced by globalization influences
the nature of the relationship between citizens and their government and therefore the
constraints the former can impose on the behavior of the latter
The motivation for this analysis is twofold. First, we believe that the control of gov-
ernmental activities is one the main problems faced by citizens. It leads us to analyze
the actual behavior of politicians as the consequence of a contract (implicit or explicit)
with the citizens of their country. In situations where the actions really chosen by the
politicians are not observable, the knowledge of the economic environment is then fun-
damental to assess the compatibility of those actions with the contract. The second and
joint motivation for this paper originates in that, with the recent trend of globalization,
the economic environment of many countries has changed. The existence of business cy-
cles, the interdependence of policies have generated the development of economic areas
of countries facing, at the same time, similar economic conditions. The objective of our
paper is then to express the link between several aspects of this economic integration and
the degree of control voters can have on their politicians.
We will use a specific definition of economic integration which covers many (but not
all) of the features of globalization. We define economic integration by two types of inter-
dependence : the similarity in the exogenous economic conditions between countries and
the links between the actions or the policies taken by the politicians.
1The volume of trade is here given by exports plus imports divided by two.
2See Rodrick (1998) for a global introduction to the economic issues induced by globalization, Feenstra
(1998) for the impact on employment and wages, Neumeyer (1998) for the gobal welfare analysis of
Monetary Union in a general equilibrium model and Corsetti-Pesenti (2001) for the study of the monetary
and fiscal transmission in interdependent economies.
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The first effect analyzed, called shock-interdependence, reflects the similarities between
the economic cycles of integrated countries. For example, France and Germany (or the
USA and Canada) are more likely to be in the same cycle than the USA and France.
Thus, we assume that economic integration goes hand in hand with a positive correlation
of shocks (see Backus-Kehoe-Kydland (1994) for empirical evidences).
The second effect taken into account, the policy-interdependence, encompasses two ingre-
dients we chose to treat jointly. The first one is related to the existence of externalities
between countries. The budgetary policy of Germany has a major influence on the wel-
fare of, say, France not only because those two countries are close geographically but also
because they belong to the same economic area. Similarly, the efforts made to control the
quality (or security) of the goods in a country have an impact on all the countries im-
porting these goods. The second ingredient is the dillution of policy effectiveness arising
in an integrated environment. In a globalized economy, many policies lack effectiveness
because of standard eviction effects.
Taking those two types of interdependence as the essential features of economic in-
tegration, we focus on the following problem. Consider an economic area with several
countries. In each of those countries, a government must choose an effort level, costly and
unobservable, to increase the welfare of its citizens. In fact, the ex post level of welfare
is also influenced by an unobservable (at least before the election) exogenous shock. We
study then whether the inclusion of a country in an integrated economic area limits or
extends the ability voters have to control their governments. In this work, we do not
study the potential economic benefits from the integration. The core questions in our
environment caracterized by informational asymmetries are then : 1) How is it possible
to assess the quality of the policy chosen in a country? 2) Does economic integration
increase the accountability of politicians?
The approach used in the paper follows the steps of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) in
that we consider the relationship between governments and voters as a simple Principal-
Agent relationship. Of course, the type of “contract” considered here is much simpler
than in a real complete contract framework. Indeed, the benefits arising out of political
activities are simple and given. Either the politician is reelected and gains the associated
private benefits; or he is fired and gains nothing. As in Ferejohn (1986), we focus on the
moral hazard aspect of this relationship, trying to find the maximal level of effort the
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voters can expect from their politicians. But our study differs from the previous work by
the analysis a series of voters/government couples (one in each country). Using yardstick
comparison methods (see Holmstro¨m (1982) or Mookherjee (1984)), we study the impact
of economic integration on the moral hazard problem faced by the voters in each country.
Our paper rests on two assumptions concerning the behavior of the voters, both con-
nected with the idea of full rationality. The first one is that agents use retrospective
economic voting. This assumption is in fact quite general in the theoretical literature
but also confirmed by many empirical studies (see for example Lewis-Beck (1988)). The
second assumption is that voters may use all types of information to infer the action of
their politician. In particular, they are able to use yardstick competition mechanisms if
those methods appear to be optimal. This implication of rationality may seem relatively
strong but some empirical studies have shown that voters are using roughly this type of
reasoning to cast their ballot (see Besley-Case (1995) or Wolfers (2000)).
In our model, the politicians are only controlled through reelection rules. One part of
our work has been to clarify the form of the optimal reelection rules in different economic
environments. But more importantly, from a political normative point of view, we have
shown that economic integration is a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, the
accountability of politicians benefits from the similarities between the economic cycles of
integrated countries. On the other hand, it induces a lack of accountability because of
the reduced effectiveness of policies.
To our knowledge, Mukand (1998) is the only paper close enough to be connected to
our work on the political implications of globalization. This article tries to show how
globalization may induce politicians to choose sub-optimal policies. The work relies on
the idea that, even though a government may possess a more precise information on the
state of the world than financial markets, a policy which would go against the general
belief would not be favored by the financial community and may trigger a currency crisis.
In other words, in a globalized world where the desire to attract foreign capital is strong,
governments may choose inappropriate policies to conform the whims of the market.
Contrarily to our approach, Mukand still considers benevolent governments, even though
they faces new contraints created by the increased volatility of capital, and therefore
neglects any real political game within the country.
After a short presentation of the model (section 2), we study a benchmark case in which
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there is no economic integration (section 3). Then (section 4) we analyze the two effects
of integration, the shock-interdependence and the policy-interdependence. We compare
the degree of accountability of politicians with economic integration and without. In the
last section, we propose some extensions and conclude.
2 The Model
We consider a setting with two countries, 1 and 2. In each country, there are two types
of agents: the voters (or citizens) and the politicians (incumbent and potential) and we
call politician i the incumbent politician in country i. Since we want to focus on the
relationship between voters and politicians, we ignore any heterogeneity within the set of
voters in each country. The objective of incumbent politicians is to be reelected. They
derive a private benefit B from their office. To ensure their position, they can make a
non observable costly effort (a in country 1, b in country 2) which increases the voters’
welfare. This effort is restricted to non-negative values. The cost of effort is assumed to
be linear in the level of effort.
In addition to this effort, the welfare (denoted Wi in country i) is a function of a non-
observable random shock (i). We mean by this that the actions taken by any government
do not always result in the same outcome. Many unforeseen and often unobservable
contingencies influence the actual outcome. We also consider the possibility that the
welfare in a given country be influenced by the actions (i.e. the policies) chosen in the
neighboring countries. So, social welfare3 is defined (for example for country 1) by the
following expression :
W1 =
a+ γ2b
1 + γ2
+ 1
with γ2 ∈ (0, 1) a measure of the policy interdependence induced by the policies in country
2 on the first country’s welfare. Remark that with this functional form, if the countries
are symmetric and if the actions chosen by governments are fixed, the introduction of
3We do not take into account the utility of the politician in the welfare function.
5
policy-interdependance does not alter social welfare4. In the main part of this paper, we
assume that both countries have approximately the same size. We therefore assume that
the policy-interpendence factors are equal, hence γ1 = γ2 = γ.
As explained before, social welfare depends on the actions taken in each country but
also on the value of an exogenous random shock. Since the two countries may be in the
same economic cycle, we define the random shocks jointly for both countries. Thus, we
assume that (1, 2) follows a normal law with mean 0 and a variance-covariance matrix
Σ where
Σ = σ2
(
1 C
C 1
)
Here, C is the correlation coefficient and measures the amount of the shock-interdependence.
To control their politicians, voters can only use very simple mechanisms. In fact, we
focus on the design of optimal retention rules based on cut-off strategies. The control
mechanisms will be based on a series of observable variables, in particular the level of
welfare reached in each country. Some statistics, such as the unemployment rate, the
growth rate or the median wage are usually public, and can be used as good proxies for
the welfare of a country. Informally, voters use a reelection rule of the following form:
“the incumbent is reelected if at the end of the period, a function (to be specified) of
the observable variables is greater then a given level; otherwise, the contract is proposed
to another politician”. This type of implicit contract follows the tradition started Barro
(1973) and used quite frequently since5.
The fundamental departure from the mechanism designed by Barro (1973) and Fere-
john (1986) lies in the existence of several voters/politician relationships. In Ferejohn’s
paper, which extends Barro’s analysis to the case of asymmetric information, voters can
only use one signal to infer the actions taken by their politicians and therefore to decide
whether to reelect him or not. In our case, the existence of two potentially interdepen-
dent countries and for both the same type of moral hazard problem potentially enlarges
the set of instruments. The reelection rule chosen, say, in country 1 can be a function
4Our results do not depend on the choice of an additive specification. For example, a multiplicative
alternative, W = (abγ)
1
1+γ , leads to equivalent results for well chosen cost effort function and law for
the random variable.
5See Ferejohn (1986) and Seabright (1996) for examples.
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of the realized level of welfare in country 1 but also in the other country, provided this
information is a signal (direct or indirect) on the effort chosen in the first country. In fact,
we will show that the optimal retention rule inducing the politicians to work will depend
on many observable variables and will be Nash-implementable.
As a conclusion of the presentation of the model, the timing of the game is presented
on Figure 1.
-
Choice of the
reelection rules
Choice of
a and b
non observed
Realisation of
1 and 1
non observed
Observation
of WA and WB
Reelection
or not
Figure 1: Timing of the game.
3 The Benchmark: No-Integration
3.1 Presentation
The no-integration case can be seen either as a one-country framework or as a multi-
country framework in which there is no interdependence between the countries. In any
case, we only focus on one country (say, country 1). Therefore, we assume that C = γ = 0.
The voters’ welfare is then given by:
W1 = a+ 1.
Voters focus on a simple retention rule based on the estimation of the effort. Let â be
the inferred level of effort once all the relevant variables have been observed. We take for
given that the voters set a rule of the cut-off type. This amounts to choose a level a and
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propose at the beginning of the period the following contract:
If â ≥ a, then the incumbent is reelected,
If â < a, then the incumbent is not reelected.
In the simple case considered here, the estimated level of effort only depends on the level
of welfare in country 1 since the actions of the politician in this country do not influence
any other variable. Even more precisely, given the assumptions on the shock, the best
estimator of a is directly given by the level of welfare realized in country 1, i.e. W1.
Therefore, the rule proposed at the beginning of the period takes a familiar form: “the
incumbent is reelected if the realized level of welfare in his country is greater than a fixed
level, i.e., if W1 ≥ a”.
We now turn to the sequential study first of the actions chosen by the politicians
conditional on the reelection rule chosen by the voters and then of the cut-off value voters
choose knowing the best response of their politician.
3.2 Behavior of the Politician
At the second stage of the game, the politician knows the cut-off level a and the way
voters will infer the level of effort he chooses. How hard does the politician choose to
work? He knows that he will be reelected if and only if, given his effort level a,
W1 ≥ a⇐⇒ 1 ≥ a− a
Let Φ be the cumulative function of the standard normal law. The probability that the
incumbent is reelected, as a function of the effort chosen, is given by:
1− Φ(a− a
σ
)
Using the assumption of linear cost of effort, the program of the politician is then:
Maxa B
(
1− Φ(a− a
σ
)
)
− a
The following lemma details the politician’s best response to a cut-off level a.
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Lemma 1 Let A = 2σ2 ln( B√
2piσ
) and σ = B√
2pi
. Let us define condition IC(A, σ) by
BΦ(
−√A
σ
))−
√
A ≥ a−BΦ(a
σ
))
- If σ ≥ σ then a∗ = 0.
- If σ ≤ σ then, if the level of effort required by the voters (a) is not too high, i.e.,
if the condition IC(A, σ) is satisfied, the politician chooses an effort level defined
by a∗ = a+
√
A. Otherwise, the politician chooses to shirk and a∗ = 0.
Proof : see Appendix 1.
This first lemma describes the optimal behavior of the incumbent politician conditional
on the voters’ requirement. In fact, his behavior depends both on the cut-off level of effort
and on the nature of the economic environment (the variance of the shock). Indeed, the
effort chosen is the sum of the cut-off level chosen by the voters and of another term (
√
A)
which depends on the variance of the shock. When the environment is very uncertain (the
variance of shocks is very large), the politician knows that his action has a limited impact
on the welfare of the voters. It is indeed the random shock which, in fine, determines this
welfare. In this case, the marginal benefits are always smaller than the marginal cost. So,
the rational choice for the politician is to shirk and hope for a favorable random shock6.
Now, if the environment is relatively stable (if the variance is not too large), the politician
really chooses his effort as a function of the cut-off a. If the cut-off level is very high, the
politician chooses to shirk since the personal cost to reach this level is too high and the
expected benefits too low. In other words, the incentive condition IC(A, σ) which states
that the politician is better off working (choosing a∗ > 0) than shirking is not satisfied.
If this cut-off level if no too high, the politician chooses a positive level of effort. More
precisely, the politician is induced to choose an effort level strictly greater than the cut-off
level (a) chosen by the voters. Indeed, if he makes exactly the minimum level of effort
required, his reelection probability is 1/2. But since the variance is small, by slightly
increasing his effort, he can almost secure his reelection.7
6This particular result comes form our choice of a a linear cost of effort. In a model with quadratic
cost, the level of effort is always positive but this level is all the smaller that the variance is large.
7This behavior does not come from any risk-aversion but may be seen as an example of self-protection
activities (see Briys-Schlesinger (1991)).
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3.3 Behavior of the voters
Since for a given level of a, the behavior of the politician is known, we can solve the first
period problem, i.e. determine the voters’ optimal reelection rule.
The welfare of those voters is an increasing function of the effort made by the politician.
Therefore, the reelection rule is such that the politician chooses the maximum possible
level of effort. Since the voters’ choice is only relevant if the variance of shocks is not too
large, we focus on this case (so σ ≤ σ). The program is then written as:
Maxa a
∗
subject to a∗ = a+
√
A if IC(A, σ) is satisfied
a∗ = 0 otherwise.
The voters’ optimal reelection rule can then be defined as follows.
Proposition 1 The optimal reelection rule is such that:
- If σ ≤ σ, a∗ is the only positive solution of the following equation
a−BΦ( a
σ
) = −√A−BΦ(−
√
A
σ
).
- If σ ≥ σ, the reelection rule does not matter and the politician always
shirks.
Proof : see Appendix 2.
The voters’ best response to the politician strategy consists in binding the incentive
constraint. The politician can always choose to shirk and hope for favorable economic
conditions. To avoid this, the voters are driven to set a cut-off value leaving the politician
just indifferent between shirking and making a positive level of effort.
The equilibrium outcome can be more precisely analyzed. In particular, it is useful to
see how this best response reacts to changes in the environment.
Corollary 1 The cut-off level of effort chosen by the voters and the effort made by the
incumbent are increasing in the benefits of the reelection and decreasing in the variance
of the random shock.
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Proof : see Appendix 3.
When the economic situation varies sharply (when the variance of the shock is large
but smaller than σ), it is very hard to infer the effort of the politician from the value of
the end-of-period welfare. Indeed, the result can always come from elements out of the
scope of control of the politician. In addition, suppose that the reelection rule is tough
(a high). Then, the politician knows that, even by working hard, his effort are unlikely
to be noticed. His incentives to work are then too small. To avoid shirking, the voters
must then choose a low cut-off level. On the contrary, when the economic environment is
stable (the variance of the shock is small), voters can relatively easily infer the extent to
which their politician has worked. Therefore, they can easily choose a high cut-off level.
A last remark can be made at this stage. The equilibrium effort is the sum of the
cut-off level chosen by the voters, always decreasing with the variance, and of another
term (
√
A) which depends of the variance of the shock. This last term is first increasing
and then decreasing in the variance of the shocks. In spite of this second effect, one can
show that the dominant effect is always generated by the variation of a. Therefore, a∗(a∗)
decreases with the variance.
4 Economic Integration
4.1 Presentation
This part aims at reconsidering the relationships between the voters and their politician
in a different economic environment. When some countries become interdependent as a
consequence of economic integration, the actions taken in one country tend to influence
not only the outcome in this country but also in the other countries of the area. How
does the existence of economically integrated countries modify then the relation between
voters and theirs politicians in those countries? What is the link between the inter-country
characteristics and the intra-country relationships between voters and politicians?
Using our simple definition of economic integration, the shock-interdependence and
the policy interdependence, we will compare the degree of control the citizens can have on
their politicians in absence of integration and with integration. The next section consists
of a separate analysis of the two features defining integration while the following proposes
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a more general study.
4.2 Specific effects of economic integration
4.2.1 The Shock-Interdependence effect
We now assume that the economic conditions between economically integrated countries
are rather similar. We do not believe that this similarity is permanent but, on average,
if one country faces favorable conditions, the other one should face the same type of
conditions. This shock-interdependence is modeled by assuming that the the random
shocks are positively correlated across countries. What does this new feature change in
the analysis of political accountability? Let us first describe loosely the new possibilities
offered to the voters and then derive the new equilibrium outcome formally.
The voters want to induce their politicians to work. As described above, they propose
a contract such that the incumbent reelection is conditional on the ex post estimation of
the effort being above a threshold level. But now, the similarity in the economic conditions
changes the way this estimation is made. What really matters for the voters is, at the
end of the period, to separate in the economic results what comes from the effort of their
politician and what comes from the general economic conditions. In this respect, voters in
country 1 (resp. 2) will use the situation in country 2 (resp. 1), the equilibrium outcome in
this country, to improve their estimation of the economic conditions in their own country.
Indeed, even if there is no formal link between the contracts signed between voters and
politicians in the two countries, each group of voters is able to use the equilibrium situation
in the other country to control its own politician. To sum up, even though politician 1
is controlled by a different set of voters than politician 2, it is possible to use yardstick
competition methods exactly the same way as if there was only a unique set of voters
controlling both politicians.
More precisely, let us consider the choice of reelection made by country 1 voters at the
end of the period. The key point of the analysis is to consider a Nash equilibrium in which
the actions of the agents in the two countries have the same structure. Since we assume
that country 1 voters know, at the end of the period the reelection rule of country 2, they
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are able to infer the equilibrium effort of politician 2, f2(b)
8. Thus after the observation
of W2, they can infer the value of the shock in country 2 (2). Then, voters update their
beliefs on the shock in their own country and, using the observation of W1, evaluate the
level of effort made by their politician.
Let us turn to the formal evaluation of the equilibrium outcome. The shock-interdependent
case corresponds to parameter values C > 0 and γ = 0. Here, the law of 1 conditional
on 2 is normal with mean 2.C and variance σ
2(1−C2). Of course, the value of 2 is not
really known; it is only inferred. Indeed, country 1 voters use the values of b and W2 to
infer, taking into account the equilibrium behavior of politician 2, the value of 2.
Since the knowledge of W2 and b allows the inference of 2 and a = W1− 1, the effort
of the politician is estimated the following way:
a˜ = W1 − E(1 /2). (1)
The reelection rule is then defined by
W1 − E(1 /2) ≥ a (R′).
Then the politician knows that he is reelected if
(R′)⇐⇒ 1 − C.2 ≥ a− a. (2)
1 − C.2 follows a normal law with zero mean and variance v2 = σ2(1− C2). Therefore,
the choice of the optimal level of effort is the solution of the following program
Maxa B(1− Φ(a− a
v
))− a
Since this program has the same form as in the previous section, we can use the same
method to derive the following lemma where IC(Z, v) is the analogous of IC(A, σ).
Lemma 2 Let Z = 2v2 ln( B√
2piv
) and σ = B√
2pi
.
- If v ≥ σ then a∗ = 0.
- If v ≤ σ then, if the level of effort required by the voters (a) is not too high, i.e.,
if the condition IC(Z, ν) is satisfied, the politician chooses an effort level defined
by a∗ = a+
√
Z. Otherwise, the politician chooses to shirk and a∗ = 0.
8Of course, at the equilibrium, f2(b) = b∗.
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Now, we derive the voters’ optimal choice. As before, they must induce the politician
to work. Knowing the politician’s best response function and taking the equilibrium
outcome in the other country as given, their optimal strategy is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 1) If v ≤ σ, a∗ is optimally chosen as the only positive solution
to the following equation
a−BΦ(a
v
) = −√Z −BΦ(−
√
Z
v
).
The reelection rule is defined by:
W1 − C.W2 ≥ a∗ − C(b∗ +
√
Z).
2) If v ≥ σ, the reelection rule does not matter and the politician always
shirks.
The first point to notice is the form of the reelection rule. When the two countries
are in the same economic cycle , the reelection rule in country 1 depends strongly on the
results in country 2. It depends also on the level of effort required in country 2. Indeed,
for an unchanged level of realized welfare in country 2, a low equilibrium level of effort
in country 2 means that the economic conditions were probably favorable (the random
shock was positive). Since the shocks are positively correlated, politician 1 has probably
also benefited from favorable conditions. In this case, the voters are more demanding to
reelect the incumbent.
Another point of this equilibrium outcome lies in the fact that the equilibrium level
of effort required in country 1 does not depend on the equilibrium effort level in the other
country. Indeed, let us suppose that in country 2 the equilibrium level of effort required by
the voters decreases. Then it is clear for everyone that politician 2’s effort will decrease.
It means in particular that voters will change the way they infer the value of 2 after
having observed W2. Since they still perfectly infer the value of 2, the change in the level
of effort required in country 2 should not influence the quality of their ex post estimation
of the effort of their politician and the politician will be aware of this change. This is
why the value b does not enter equation (2) which determines the equilibrium behavior
of politician 1.
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The important question is then to know whether the shock-interdependence increases
or decreases the effort of the politicians.
Proposition 3 When economic integration induces a shock-interdependence, the cut-off
level chosen by the voters and the effort level of the politician increase.
Proof : see appendix 4.
The existence of shock-interdependence creates a favorable setting to induce politicians
to work. This is mainly due to the fact that the voters in country 1 have two clear signals to
construct their incentive scheme instead of one in the no-integration benchmark. Using the
realization of the welfare in country 2, they will make their inference with a much higher
precision. More technically, the variance v2 is an inverse measure of the ease with which
the effort of the politician can be inferred. This variance in the shock-interdependent case
is smaller than in the benchmark case. Therefore the voters can assess more precisely
the level of effort made by the politician and they can, at the first stage, set a higher
cut-off level. Similarly, the politician knows that by making a higher effort, he increases
significantly his chances of reelection since his effort will be easily differentiated from the
random shock. As a consequence, one can directly state the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Social welfare is higher with shock-interdependence than without.
Proof : it follows from the fact that social welfare is increasing with the level of effort.
It must be clear from the previous results that the utility of the politician is smaller in
this case than in the previous case. Indeed, since the IC condition is binding, his utility is
equal to his gains if he shirks. These gains are defined, in the case of shock-independence,
by
U0 = B(1− Φ(a
∗
σ
))
In the shock-interdependent case, it is defined by
U ′0 = B(1− Φ(
a′∗
v
))
where a′∗ is the new cut-off level set by the voters. Since a′∗ > a∗ and σ > v, one can
easily see that U ′0 < U0. In other words, the reservation utility of the politician depends
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on his probability of reelection if he shirks. This probability increases as the fluctuations
(or more exactly as the uncertainty) of the economic conditions increase. Since σ > v,
the uncertainty is reduced when the shocks are interdependent and thus the reservation
utility of the politicians is lower.
4.2.2 The Policy-Interdependence effect
The second effect corresponds to the case in which the cross-countries effects concern
the chosen policies (the efforts). Externalities and dillution effects induce the following
problem. On the one hand, each politician knows that his effort has only a limited
influence on the welfare of his constituents. Compared to the benchmark case without
interdependence, the politician is less accountable for the end-of-period welfare since his
action is only one of the several causes of this welfare. On the other hand, since the effort
made by politician 1 influences the welfare in both countries, voters may use both welfare
values to infer the true level of effort chosen by their politician. Loosely speaking, in
the shock-interdependent case the additional signal was useful to infer the true economic
conditions (the realization of the random shock) while now it is directly useful to infer
the level of effort chosen by the politician.
More precisely, this case can be analyzed using the general model with parameter
values C = 0 and γ > 0. The effort made by politician 1 is evaluated using W1, W2 and
the inferred value of b, f2(b). The voters observe both welfares, knowing that the first is
drawn from a normal law with mean (a + γf2(b))/(1 + γ) and variance σ
2, the second
drawn from a normal law with mean (f2(b) + γa)/(1 + γ) and variance σ
2. From this
information, they infer the value of the effort of politician 2. Then, using the likelihood
method, they can derive an estimator of a.
Lemma 3 The best estimator of a knowing W1, W2 and b can be written :
â =
1 + γ
1 + γ2
(W1 + γW2)− 2γf2(b)
1 + γ2
(3)
Proof : see appendix 5.
The reelection rule is then written
1 + γ
1 + γ2
(W1 + γW2)− 2γf2(b)
1 + γ2
≥ a.
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Therefore, the politician knows that he is reelected if and only if:
(1 + γ2)
(1 + γ)
(1 + γ2)
≥ a− a
Since 1 and 2 are independent, (1 +γ2)(1+γ)/(1+γ
2) follows a normal law with mean
0 and variance ω2 = σ2 (1+γ)
2
(1+γ2)
.
For the politician, the optimal choice of effort is the solution of the following program:
Maxa B
(
1− Φ(a− a
ω
)
)
− a
Since this program has the same form as before, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let E = 2ω2 ln( B√
2piω
) and σ = B√
2pi
- If ω ≥ σ then a∗ = 0
- If ω ≤ σ then, if the level of effort required by the voters (a) is not too high, i.e.
if the condition IC(E, ω) is satisfied, the politician chooses an effort level defined
by a∗ = a+
√
E. Otherwise, the politician chooses to shirk and a∗ = 0.
We can then derive the following proposition:
Proposition 4 1) If ω ≤ σ, a∗ is optimally chosen as the only positive solution
to the following equation
a−BΦ( a
ω
) = −√E −BΦ(−
√
E
ω
).
The reelection rule is defined in the first period by :
W1 + γW2 ≥ 1 + γ
2
1 + γ
a∗ +
2γ(b+
√
E)
1 + γ
,
2) If ω ≥ σ, the reelection rule does not matter and the politician shirks.
In this case, the realized welfare values in the two countries are substitute to assess
the performance of the politicians. This substitutability is all the stronger that the policy
interdependence is strong. The effect of the toughness of a rule (the value of b) in the
second country on the reelection rule of the first country is reversed compared with the
previous case. Indeed, a high required level of effort in country 2 helps a politician in
country 1 to reach a high level of welfare for his country. Therefore, the levels of welfare
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ensuring the reelection of country 1 politician must be higher. As before, even if the cut-
off chosen in the second country (b) influences the reelection rule, it has no impact of the
required level of effort in the first country. This level is always given by the indifference
condition of the politician between shirking and working.
We show also this additional result.
Proposition 5 When economic integration induces policy interdependence, the effort of
the politician and the cut-off level set by the voters decrease.
Proof: remark that ω = σ (1+γ)√
1+γ2
> σ and use corollary 1.
The decrease in the level of effort made by the politician in the policy-interdependent
case does not originated from free-riding behaviors since we saw before that the equilib-
rium level of effort in a given country does not influence the equilibrium effort in the other
country. It comes much more from the smaller importance of his effort in the determi-
nation of the welfare compared with the random shock. When policy-interdependence is
strong, the relative importance of the actions of the politician for the welfare of the voters
is small. Therefore, a high level of effort does not have a large positive impact on the
welfare of the voters and can do little for the reelection of the incumbent. It is thus a lack
of transparency which limits the ability to set a high cut-off level in this case in spite of
using two signals to infer the effort chosen by the politician. The direct consequence of
the previous proposition is then :
Corollary 3 Social welfare in lower with policy-interdependence than without.
Proof : it follows from the fact that the welfare is increasing with the level of effort.
Finally, since the cut-off level decreases and that the variance increases compared to
the autarkical case, the utility of the politician is higher in this case than in the previous
cases.
4.3 General Study of Economic Integration
This part proposes a complete analysis taking into account the two types of interde-
pendence. As before, the voters of country 1 want to evaluate the effort made by their
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politician. To this end, they use the information provided by the welfare values W1 and
W2 either directly to infer the level of effort a or to infer first the level of the shock (1)
and then the level of effort chosen by their politician.
(W1, W2) follows a normal law with mean
1
1+γ
(
a+ γb
b+ γa
)
and variances-covariances
matrix Σ = σ2
(
1 C
C 1
)
. Knowing W1, W2 and b, a can be evaluated as follows:
Lemma 5 The best estimator of a knowing W1, W2 and b can be written:
â′ =
1
1 + γ2 − 2γC
(
(1 + γ)(W1(1− γC) +W2(γ − C)) + f2(b)((1 + γ2)C − 2γ)
)
(4)
Proof : see appendix 6.
Since C is always less than 1, the estimate of a is always increasing with the observed
value of W1. On the contrary, the impact of W2 and of f2(b) (the inference of b) depends
on the relative importance of the two type of interdependence.
When the shock-interdependence effect dominates, a high value of f2(b) (for a fixed
W2) is used to infer that the shock in country 2 has been small. Since the shocks in both
countries are positively correlated, the one in country 1 is likely to be either positive and
small or negative. In this case, a high value of W1 is very likely to be the consequence of
a high effort of politician 1. To sum up this case, if the inferred value of b is high, the
voters in country 1 believe that their politician can be given the credit for a high level
of W1. Let us suppose now that the policy-interdependence effect is dominant. In this
case, if the inferred value of b (for a given W1) is high, the voters in country are driven
to believe that politician 1 has chosen a low level of effort.
In a situation where the two types of interdependence coexist, inferring the effort made
by the politicians is a difficult matter. Voters have at their disposal two signals but those
signals must be used differently according to the situation. For example, a good economic
result in one country is a positive signal of the effort for the other country politician if
policy-interdependence is strong while it is a negative signal when shock-interdependence
dominates. To assess the quality of the work made by the politicians, it then necessary
to study in details the nature of the economic relationships between the countries.
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Using the formula (4), we write the problem faced by the politician in country 1. He
is reelected if and only if :
(1 + γ)
(1 + γ2 − 2γC) (1(1− γC) + 2(γ − C)) ≥ a− a
The left hand side is a random variable following a normal law with mean 0 and variance
v̂2 = σ2
(1 + γ)2
(1 + γ2 − 2γC)(1 − C
2). We know from the previous section that the extent to
which the politician makes a high effort depends on the value of the variance. Indeed,
the lower the variance, the higher the level of effort. How do the shock and policy
interdependence parameters jointly affect the ease with which politician can be controlled?
Proposition 6 Increasing policy-interdependence always decreases the equilibrium level
of effort chosen by the politician whereas increasing shock-interdependence leads to higher
effort only if the policy-interdependence factor is small (if γ < C).
Proof : see Appendix 7.
Even if most of the effects studied previously remain on aggregate, there is an impor-
tant difference. An increase in the degree of shock-interdependence does not uniformly
drive a higher level of effort. Indeed, consider a situation where policy-interdependence
is strong while shock-interdependence is small. What matters then for the voters is to
use as many different signals as possible on the effort made by their politician. Increas-
ing shock-interdependence makes the two signals much more the same which is harmful
for the voters. Of course, if this interdependence becomes very high, the voters will
use the signals to infer indirectly the effort by focusing on the direct inference of the
shock and in this respect, increasing shock-interdependence is useful. But as long as
policy-interdependence dominates shock-interdependence, an increase in the amount of
shock-interdependence decreases the precision of the information structure and leads to
a decrease in the equilibrium level of effort.
In spite of this effect, if there is a dominant type of interdependence, it is possible to
rank integration and autarchy from a welfare perspective.
Proposition 7 If shock-interdependence is strong (resp. weak) and policy-interdependence
weak (resp. strong), economic integration (resp. non-integration) is socially preferable to
non-integration (resp. economic integration).
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Proof : the analysis of formula (4) shows that if γ = 0, we are back to the expression
(1) whereas if C = 0, we can get the expression (3). Using the continuity of the function
leads to the results.
The previous proposition states that the welfare effects of integration depend on the
way countries interact with each other. If integration mainly coordinates the economic
cycles (such as demand or productivity shocks), it increases the degree of control voters
have of their politicians. If it mainly mixes and dilutes the consequence of the policies
chosen in both countries, integration reduces the degree of control and is socially harmful.
5 Extensions and Conclusions
5.1 Integration and choice of politicians
Shock-interdependence may provide useful pieces of information to increase the account-
ability of the politicians whereas policy-interdependence has an opposite effect. In our
framework we have focused on a moral hazard problem: the possibility of yardstick compe-
tition influences, using the term coined by Banks and Sundaram (1998), the performance
effect, i.e. the incentives to work. We could also consider the polar case in which politi-
cians do not have any action to choose and where the welfare of the voters depends on
the unknown quality (or type) of their politician.
More precisely, let βi ∈ {0, β} with β > 0 be the type of the politician in country i.
In country i, the politician can be good (βi = β) with a probability λ or bad (βi = 0)
with a probability 1− λ. The welfare of the citizens of country i is now :
Wi =
βi + γβj
1 + γ
+ εi.
Whereas in a hazard moral framework, it is very important that the voters announce
credibly a reelection rule, it is not the case anymore. At the end of the period, the voters
simply decide to keep their politician if his updated expected type is higher than the
average type of a randomly chosen politician (λβ). The problem is then to assess the
quality of the selection effect, i.e. the quality of the screening at the end of the period in
different environments.
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One can easily show that the new problem is only statistical since politicians do not
choose any actions. And the results obtained in a hazard moral framework still apply
when one focuses on adverse selection.
5.2 Asymmetric Countries
We go back to the main analysis where we focus on a moral hazard problem but we drop
the assumption of symmetric countries. There may be two consequences of size differences:
the policy-interdependence factors can be different between countries and there may be
a leading country in the sense that this country is first to face, say, a productivity shock
while the other faces it only one period after.
We first concentrate on the difference in the policy-interdependence factors. Let us
then assume that country 1 is larger than country 2 and model this new situation by
setting the following parameter values: γ1 = 1 and 0 ≤ γ2 < 1. Therefore, the actions
chosen by politician 1 affects country 2’s social welfare the same way as politician 2’s
actions. In this situation, it is easier to control political behavior in country 1 than in
country 29. To control the first politician, W1 and W2 provide useful pieces of information
since both results strongly depend on the action chosen by this politician. The comparison
with the second politician reveals that even if W2 is a useful signal, W1 is not as good a
signal of his action as W2 is a good signal of the actions of the first politician (because
γ2 < γ1). There is nevertheless one case where both politicians can be controlled with
the same precision. Indeed, if the shocks are perfectly correlated, one signal is enough
to control both politicians so country 2 does not suffer from the lack of precision of the
second signal.
Consider now the possible delay in the way shocks affect countries 1 and 2. In this case,
country 1 voters can control its politician using only its own results whereas country 2
can use three signals: the past performance in country 1 to assess the value of the present
shock, its present performance and the present performance of country 1 since this signal
contains some information on the present action. It is then clear that politicians in small
countries, here in country 2, will be more easily controlled than in large countries.
9This results can be shown formally by computing the precision of the estimation in both cases with
the technics used in this paper.
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5.3 Conclusions
This paper analyzes how voters can control the effort made by their politicians in different
economic situations. In the setting developed above, voters cannot observe (at least
exactly) the amount of effort their politicians have chosen and they do not know when
they observe the economic performances of their country which part comes from this
effort and which part is due to exogenous factors. To disentangle the different elements,
voters can use several signals whose numbers and precision vary with the nature of the
economic links between the countries. For example, in the integrated case, voters can use
more signals to control the behavior of their politicians than without integration but each
signal may contain a smaller amount of relevant information.
More precisely, we have shown that economic integration could generate the two types
of effect and then affects positively or negatively the ease with which politicians can be
controlled. Indeed, economic integration appears as a two-sided phenomenon. On the one
hand, it allows yardstick comparison which is good for the control of politicians when inte-
gration induces some interdependence in the shocks, i.e. some similarities in the economic
cycles. On the other hand, with policy-interdependence, it dilutes the responsibility of
politicians by bluring the impact of their actions. These two effects go in opposite di-
rections and it is hard to guess which one is the more important. But in any case, the
extent to which economic integration or any other change in the economic organization
of a group of countries increases political accountability is inversely proportional to the
real degree of uncertainty on the economic conditions.
One of the postulates of this work has been to consider politicians as self-interested
agents, without any preference or ideology. Even if this view, which follows the steps of the
Public Choice school (see Buchanan and Tullock (1962)), is probably extreme, it simplifies
the analysis and stresses the problem of accountability when the only possible contract
between voters and politicians is a reelection rule. A natural development of this paper
would be to introduce different possible preferences in the country as well as between
countries. From a fiscal federalism perspective, it could also be interesting to analyze the
impact of a political union with only one decision maker for all the countries. Those future
extensions will probably be useful to deepen our understanding of the political impact of
globalization.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: proof of lemma 1.
For an interior solution, the first order condition is
B√
2piσ
e
−
(a− a∗)2
2σ2 − 1 = 0.
We can easily see that, for a ≥ 0, there is an interior solution if B√
2piσ
> 1. In the other
cases, we get a∗ = 0.
The second order condition is
B√
2piσ3
(a− a)e−
(a− a)2
2σ2 ≤ 0.
• If a ≥ a, the objective function is convex.
The politician must choose between a = 0 and a = a. Let Ua be the utility of the
politician if his action is a.
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If a = 0, U0 = B(1− Φ( aσ )).
If a = a, Ua = B(
1
2
)− a.
U0 ≥ Ua ⇐⇒ a− Φ(a
σ
)) +B(
1
2
) ≥ 0.
Let f(a) = a− Φ( a
σ
)) +B(1
2
).
f ′(a) = 1− B√
2piσ
e
−
a2
2σ2 ; f ′′(a) =
B√
2piσ3
ae
−
a2
2σ2 > 0.
If f ′(0) ≥ 0, then f ′(a) ≥ 0 for a ≥ 0. Since f(0) = 0, we would have f ≥ 0.
f ′(0) ≥ 0⇐⇒ σ ≥ B√
2pi
.
Therefore if σ ≥ B√
2pi
, a∗ = 0
If σ ≤ B√
2pi
, the optimal value between 0 and a is 0 if f(a) is positive (for a high a)
and a if f(a) is negative (for a small a).
• If a ≤ a, the objective function is concave.
Using the first order condition, we obtain
a∗ = a+
√
2σ2 ln(
B√
2piσ
).
If σ ≥ B√
2pi
, a∗ = 0.
Otherwise, one must compare the utility in the two cases. If, in the case a ≥ a, a is
the optimum, we know that the global optimum is given by the first order condition since
the maximization space includes also a. Otherwise, one must compare the utility without
effort and the utility with a∗.
The politician chooses a∗ rather than 0 if and only if :
Ua∗ ≥ U0 ⇐⇒ −BΦ(−
√
A
σ
)−
√
A ≥ a−BΦ(a
σ
)
with A = 2σ2 ln( B√
2piσ
).
Q.E.D.
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Appendix 2 : proof of proposition 1.
A simple look at the objective function of the voters shows that the incentive constraint
will bind. Let us then define F (a) = −a + BΦ( a
σ
) − BΦ(−
√
A
σ
)) − √A. This function is
convex for a ≤ 0 and concave otherwise. It is also easy to see that there are 2 optima
when a = −√A and a = √A
Now, since F is convex for a ≤ 0, reaches its minimum for a = −√A and since
F (−√A) = 0, it is direct to conclude that F is positive for a ≤ 0.
From above, we know that F (0) > 0. Since F is strictly concave for a ≥ 0 and tends
to minus infinity, there is a unique positive solution to the equation F (a) = 0, and this
solution is greater than
√
A.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 3 : proof of corollary 1 .
The cut-off level of effort set by the voters is defined by:
a∗ −BΦ(a
σ
∗
) = −
√
A−BΦ(−
√
A
σ
).
From the previous appendix, we know that ∂F
∂a
≤ 0 around the optimal value.
• ∂F
∂σ
∂F
∂σ
= − B√
2piσ2
ae
−
a2
2σ2 − A
′(σ)
2
√
A(σ)
− 1√
2 ln( B√
2piσ
)
.
A′(σ) = 2σ(2 ln( B√
2piσ
)− 1). Therefore,
∂F
∂σ
= − B√
2piσ2
ae
−
a2
2σ2 −
2σ(2 ln( B√
2piσ
)− 1)
2
√
A(σ)
− 1√
2 ln( B√
2piσ
)
= − B√
2piσ2
ae
−
a2
2σ2 −
2σ(2 ln( B√
2piσ
)− 1)
2
√
2σ2 ln( B√
2piσ
)
− 2σ
2
√
2σ2 ln( B√
2piσ
)
= − B√
2piσ2
ae
−
a2
2σ2 −
√
2 ln(
B√
2piσ
) < 0.
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• ∂F
∂B
∂F
∂B
= +Φ(
a
σ
)− A
′(B)
2
√
A(B)
− Φ(−
√
A(B)
σ
) +
B√
2piσ
a.e
−
(A(B))2
2σ2
A′(σ)
2
√
A(σ)
.
Since A′(B) = 2σ
2
B
and e
−
(A(B))2
2σ2 =
√
2pi
B
σ, we can find
∂F
∂B
= +Φ(
a
σ
)− Φ(−
√
A(B)
σ
) > 0
Using the implicit function theorem, we find that
∂a
∂σ
= −
∂F
∂σ
∂F
∂a
< 0;
∂a
∂B
= −
∂F
∂B
∂F
∂a
> 0.
Moreover,
∂a
∂σ
=
∂a
∂σ
+
A′(σ)
2
√
A(σ)
.
If A′(σ) < 0, both effects go in the same direction therefore
∂a
∂σ
< 0.
If A′(σ) > 0,
∂a
∂σ
= − 1
∂F
∂a
(−∂F
∂σ
+
∂F
∂a
.
A′(σ)
2
√
A(σ)
)
=
1
∂F
∂a
 B√
2piσ2
ae
−
a2
2σ2 +
A′(σ)
2
√
A(σ)
+
σ
2
√
A(σ)
− A
′(σ)
2
√
A(σ)
(1− B√
2piσ
e
−
a2
2σ2 )

=
1
∂F
∂a
 B√
2piσ2
ae
−
a2
2σ2 +
σ
2
√
A(σ)
+
A′(σ)
2
√
A(σ)
B√
2piσ
e
−
a2
2σ2
 < 0.
Finally,
∂a
∂B
=
∂a
∂B
+
A′(B)
2
√
A(B)
> 0.
Q.E.D.
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Appendix 4 : proof of proposition 3.
From corollary 1, we know that
∂a∗
∂σ
< 0 and
∂a∗
∂σ
< 0. Therefore, in order to know
whether shock interdependence, correlation, induces an increase or a decrease in the level
of a∗ and a∗, one must just compare σ and v. If v ≤ σ (resp. v ≥ σ), correlation lead to
an increase in the levels of effort.
σ2 − v2 = σ2C2 > 0.
Therefore, for a positive level of correlation, the level of effort chosen by the politician
increases.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 5 : proof of lemma 3
We try to find an estimation (â) of a using the likelihood method. After the observation
of W1 and W2, the likelihood function can be written
f(W1,W2) = f(W1).f(W2)
=
e−H(a)
2piσ2
With H(a) =
1
2σ2
(
(W1 − a+ γf2(b)
1 + γ
)2 + (W2 − f2(b) + γa
1 + γ
)2
)
.
Maximizing f(W1,W2) amounts to the maximization of −H(a). Since H(a)′′ > 0, the
study of the first order condition is sufficient.
H ′(â) = 0⇐⇒ 1
(1 + γ)σ2
((W1 − â+ γf2(b)
1 + γ
) + γ(W2 − f2(b) + γâ
1 + γ
)) = 0
therefore,
â =
1 + γ
1 + γ2
(W1 + γW2)− 2γf2(b)
1 + γ2
.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 6 : proof of lemma 5.
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We try to find an estimation (â) of a using the likelihood method. After the observation
of W1 and W2, the likelihood function can be written
f(W1,W2) = f(W1 / W2).f(W2)
W1 / W2 follows a normal law with mean m(a) and variance σ
2(1 − C2) where m(a) =
a+γf2(b)
1+γ
+ C(W2 − f2(b)+γa1+γ ).
The likelihood function can be written
f(W1,W2) =
1
2piσ2
√
(1− C2)e
−G(a)
with G(a) = 1
2σ2(1−C2)
(
(W1 −m(a))2 + (1− C2)(W2 − f2(b)+γa1+γ )2
)
.
Maximizing f(W1,W2) amounts to the maximization of −G(a). Since G(a)′′ > 0, the
study of the first order condition is sufficient.
G′(â′) = 0⇐⇒ (m′(â′)(W1 −m(â′)) + γ
1 + γ
(1− C2)(W2 − f2(b) + γâ
′
1 + γ
)) = 0.
m′(â′) = 1
1+γ
(1− γC) thus we get:
((1− γC)(W1 − â
′ + γf2(b)
1 + γ
− C(W2 − f2(b) + γâ
′
1 + γ
))
+ γ(1− C2)(W2 − f2(b) + γâ
′
1 + γ
)) = 0
After simplifications, we find:
â′ =
1
1 + γ2 − 2γC
(
(1 + γ)(W1(1− γC) +W2(γ − C)) + f2(b)((1 + γ2)C − 2γ)
)
.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 7 : proof of proposition 6.
Let h(γ, C) =
(1 + γ)2
(1 + γ2 − 2γC)(1− C
2).
∂h
∂γ
=
2 (1 + γ) (1− C2)
(1 + γ2 − 2γC)2 (1− γ)(1 + C)
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Since 0 < γ < 1,
∂h
∂γ
> 0
∂h
∂C
= −2(C − γ)(1 + Cγ) (1 + γ)
2
(1 + γ2 − 2γC)2
So
∂h
∂C
≥ 0⇔ C ≤ γ.
Q.E.D.
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